The Economic Legacy of Warfare: Evidence from European Regions by Cassidy, Traviss et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RA Economics and institutional change 
 
The Economic Legacy of 
Warfare. 
Evidence from European 
Regions 
 
 
 
Traviss Cassidy 
Mark Dincecco 
Massimiliano Gaetano Onorato 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 2279-6894   
IMT LUCCA EIC WORKING 
PAPER SERIES 06 
July 2015 
Updated March 2016 
#06 
2015 
  
 
 
 
ISSN 2279-6894  
IMT LUCCA EIC WORKING PAPER SERIES #06/2015 
© IMT Institute for Advanced Studies Lucca 
Piazza San Ponziano 6, 55100 Lucca 
 
Research Area 
Economics and institutional change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Economic Legacy of Warfare. 
Evidence from European Regions 
 
 
 
 
Traviss Cassidy 
University of Michigan 
Mark Dincecco 
University of Michigan 
Massimiliano Gaetano Onorato 
IMT Institute of Advanced Studies Lucca 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Economic Legacy of Warfare
Evidence from European Regions∗
Traviss Cassidy† Mark Dincecco‡ Massimiliano Gaetano Onorato§
March 14, 2016
Abstract
Historical warfare in Europe inflicted numerous costs on rural populations. To reduce
such costs, rural populations relocated behind the relative safety of urban fortifications.
We argue that war-related urbanization had positive consequences for long-run regional
economic development. We geocode the locations of more than 600 conflicts in early
modern Europe. We find a positive and significant relationship between historical con-
flict exposure and regional economic development today. Our results are robust to a wide
range of econometric techniques, alternative samples, and economic outcomes. Human
capital accumulation stands out as one channel through which war-related urbanization
translated into regional economic development. Our results highlight the military ori-
gins of Europe’s wealthy urban belt.
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1 Introduction
The economic rise of Europe represents a major historical breakthrough. From 1500 to 2000,
average real per capita income in Western Europe grew 15-fold (Maddison, 2010). Many
scholars argue that urban centers played a fundamental role in Europe’s rise (e.g., Smith,
1776, Weber, 1922, Pirenne, 1925, Bairoch, 1988, Glaeser, 2011). Today, a belt of highly ur-
banized regions – called the “urban belt” – forms Europe’s economic backbone (Polese, 2009,
p. 72).
This paper analyzes a novel source of long-run regional economic prosperity in Europe:
warfare. Warfare was a fundamental part of European history (Tilly, 1992, p. 72). Parker
(1996, p. 1) writes: “Hardly a decade can be found before 1815 in which at least one battle
did not take place.” We argue that, over the long run, greater historical warfare translated
into regional economic development. Historical warfare inflicted many costs on rural popu-
lations. To reduce such costs, rural populations relocated behind the relative safety of urban
fortifications. War-related urbanization, in turn, had positive economic consequences. Rural
manufacturers and entrepreneurs under the threat of warfare could not only move their cap-
ital behind urban fortifications for safety, but could take advantage of urban private property
rights. Furthermore, war-related urbanization could promote technological innovation and
human capital accumulation. Finally, urban-based economic agglomeration effects could
reduce the exchange costs for goods and labor. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is
the first systematic analysis of the military origins of Europe’s wealthy urban belt.
To perform this analysis, we construct a new database that links past and present. First,
we identify the locations of more than 600 conflicts fought on land in early modern Europe
(i.e., between 1500 and 1799). To measure regional exposure to historical warfare, we take
a “market potential” approach whereby a region’s conflict exposure is increasing in its ge-
ographical proximity to historical conflicts. Second, we gather modern economic data and
geophysically scaled economic data at the regional level.
Our empirical analysis models regional economic activity today as a function of historical
conflict exposure, controls for initial demography and local geographic features, and fixed
effects by country. The results of this analysis indicate that the economic legacy of historical
warfare is significant. We find that a one standard deviation increase in historical conflict
exposure predicts a 17 to 20 percent average increase in current regional per capita GDP.
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Our analysis controls for a wide variety of regional and national features. Still, it is
possible that omitted factors that affect both historical warfare and regional economic de-
velopment bias our results. To address this possibility, we use the historical presence of a
young ruler (i.e., under the age of 16) to instrument for historical conflict exposure. The un-
derlying logic is that, by virtue of governing inexperience, a young ruler is more likely than
a mature ruler to 1) be vulnerable to attack by nearby states or 2) initiate conflict with nearby
states. Thus, when a young ruler is on the throne, historical conflict exposure will increase
in regions near the sovereign borders of the young ruler’s polity. The IV analysis produces
estimates that are similar in magnitude and significance to the main results. To evaluate the
plausibility of our exogeneity assumption, we perform a sensitivity analysis. This analysis
indicates that the IV results are robust to moderate violations of the exclusion restriction.
Our analysis accounts for different factors (e.g., initial demography, local geographic fea-
tures) which could influence selection into historical conflicts. Still, both historical conflicts
and the controls themselves could affect economic activity in a non-linear manner. To ad-
dress this possibility, we estimate a semi-parametric treatment-effects model which allows
for non-linear effects through the use of propensity scores. This analysis produces estimates
of similar magnitude and significance as the main estimates. Furthermore, this analysis sug-
gests that the relationship between historical warfare and regional economic development
is in fact linear, validating our benchmark specification.
We test the robustness of our results in several other ways. As an another approach to
account for omitted variable bias, we replace the country fixed effects with macro-regional
(i.e., sub-national) fixed effects and re-run our main analysis. This approach produces esti-
mates that are similar in magnitude and significance as before. Furthermore, we show that
our results are robust to different conflict samples (e.g., battles only), different regional sam-
ples (e.g., exclude urban belt, exclude regions one by one), and alternative outcomes (e.g.,
regional population density, gross cell product).
Finally, we test for potential channels through which historical war-related urbanization
can translate into long-run regional economic development. We examine three potential
channels based on our conceptual framework: property rights protection, human capital ac-
cumulation, and economic agglomeration effects. The results of this analysis suggest that
human capital accumulation stands out as one channel that mediates the relationship be-
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tween historical war-related urbanization and regional economic development today.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the historical roots of economic development
(Nunn, 2014). Scholars have linked military competition and state formation to long-run
economic prosperity (Bates, 2010, Besley and Persson, 2011, O’Brien, 2011, Rosenthal and
Wong, 2011, Dincecco and Prado, 2012, Voigtla¨nder and Voth, 2013a,b, Morris, 2014). This
literature tends to study the economic consequences of historical warfare for nation-states.
By contrast, we analyze the economic legacy of historical warfare at the sub-national level.
Europe’s economic backbone is the belt of highly urbanized regions that span southern Eng-
land, Belgium and the Netherlands, eastern France and western Germany, and northern
Italy. In history, rural inhabitants under the threat of warfare relocated behind the relative
safety of urban fortifications. Institutional development at the local level was often a his-
torical precursor to state-level development (Stasavage, 2011, Blaydes and Paik, 2015). For
all of the above reasons, it makes sense to analyze how historical warfare has influenced
regional – versus national – economic development. To make our argument, we construct a
new sub-national database that spans the early modern era to the present day. Our analysis
of the urban belt’s path from warfare to wealth provides new insights into the economic rise
of Europe.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops our conceptual framework. Section
3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy and main results. Section 5
performs the IV analysis. Section 6 presents the propensity score weighting results. Section
7 performs further robustness checks. Section 8 tests for transmission channels. Section 9
concludes.
2 Conceptual Framework
Our argument proceeds in two parts. First, we discuss the historical relationship between
warfare and urbanization. Second, we discuss potential channels through which historical
war-related urbanization can translate into regional economic development over the long
run.
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2.1 Warfare and Urbanization
Security was an important historical function of urban centers. Urban fortifications (outer
rings of conjoined dwellings, defensive palisades or ramparts, fortified walls, bastioned
traces) served at least two traditional security functions (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2002). First,
urban fortifications were difficult to overcome, allowing small groups of defenders to with-
stand large attacks. Second, urban fortifications created a scale economy whereby the length
of fortifications necessary to protect urban inhabitants fell sharply as urban populations
grew.
Indeed, warfare could inflict many costs on rural populations. A first cost was property
destruction by soldiers along the war march (Gutmann, 1980, pp. 32-5, Hale, 1985, pp. 182-3,
186-7, Caferro, 2008, pp. 186-7). Gutmann (1980, p. 33) writes: “Soldiers’ actions read like
a textbook outline of criminal practices: burning, looting, assault, rape, murder, thievery
and desecration of churches.” A second cost was the traditional duty of billeting soldiers
in preparation for battle, in garrison or during winter, or to rest after battle’s end (Gut-
mann, 1980, pp. 36-9, Hale, 1985, pp. 187-91, 196-7). A third cost was the loss of agricultural
manpower due to the military’s demands for short-term labor or recruits (Gutmann, 1980,
pp. 39-41, Hale, 1985, p. 196). A final cost was rural money-raising, including the military’s
right of expropriation in occupied zones and its right to collect contributions in nearby zones
(Gutmann, 1980, pp. 41-6, Hale, 1985, p. 185).
To reduce the costs of warfare, rural inhabitants relocated behind the relative safety of ur-
ban fortifications. Glaeser and Shapiro (2002, p. 208) call this effect the “safe harbor” effect,
writing: “Indeed, the role of cities in protecting their residents against outside attackers is
one of the main reasons why many cities developed over time.” For example, the Dutch Re-
volt against Spanish rule over the latter half of the sixteenth century drove roughly 100,000
migrants north to the urban centers in the Dutch Republic (Moch, 2003, pp. 26-7, Winter,
2013, p. 406).1 Many such urban migrants came from small villages (Verhulst, 1999, pp.
1Warfare could cause urban destruction, an effect that Glaeser and Shapiro (2002, p. 210) call the “target”
effect. Well-known sacks include Rome in 1527, Antwerp in 1576, and Magdeburg in 1631. However, such
sacks were rare (Friedrichs, 1995, p. 296). Friedrichs (1995, p. 300) writes: “No city was every completely
destroyed by warfare.” This observation conforms with Livi-Bacci’s (2000, p. 36) general observation that,
even if specific urban centers in early modern Europe saw relative decay, examples of outright disappearance
(for any reason) were uncommon.
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154-5).2
There is econometric evidence that is consistent with the safe harbor effect. Voigtla¨nder
and Voth (2013b) analyze a sample of roughly 20 countries between 1300 and 1700, finding
that urbanization rates rose by more than 7 percentage points for countries that saw above-
average war frequency, but rose less than 3 percentage points for countries that saw less
frequent wars. Dincecco and Onorato (2016) analyze a sample of nearly 700 cities between
800 and 1800, finding that conflict exposure was associated with a 6-11 percent average
increase in city populations per century.
2.2 Transmission Channels
We now describe three potential channels through which historical war-related urbanization
(i.e., the safe harbor effect) can translate into long-run regional economic development.
2.2.1 Mobile Capital and Property Rights
As described above, rural populations feared the potential property loss that warfare could
inflict. Rosenthal and Wong (2011, p. 105-10) argue that warfare induced an urban bias to
manufacturing activity. Unlike agricultural activity, manufacturing activity was not bound
to the land. Furthermore, because manufacturing capital was mobile, it was prone to thiev-
ery by soldiers marching by. Rural manufacturers thus had an incentive to move their capital
behind the relative safety of urban fortifications. Indeed, urban centers were the focal point
of manufacturing activity in early modern Europe (van Bavel et al., 2013, p. 385).
Beyond the relative safety of urban fortifications, urban centers could often provide man-
ufacturers and entrepreneurs with access to local political institutions which protected pri-
vate property from predatory rulers. Max Weber (1922, pp. 181-90) argues that private prop-
erty rights were a defining characteristic of the historical city. Adam Smith (1776, p. 253)
writes: “Order and good government, and along with them the liberty and security of indi-
viduals, were, in this manner, established in cities at a time when the occupiers of land in the
2In European history, there was an “urban graveyard” effect which combined high urban death rates due to
epidemics with low urban birth rates (Friedrichs, 1995, pp. 130-1, Moch, 2003, pp. 44-5, Winter, 2013, p. 404).
Still even if there were potential costs to urban life, there were economic and political benefits. Boone (2013, p.
234) writes: “Indeed, even in the harsher times of demographic crisis, the city continued to attract newcomers,
despite the urban graveyard effect it exercised. To many, therefore, the advantages of living in a city clearly
outweighed the disadvantages and inherent risks.” Furthermore, infant mortality was a significant contribu-
tor to the rural-urban mortality differential (Voigtla¨nder and Voth, 2013a, p. 780). Thus, urban migrants may
not have been the main victims of the urban graveyard effect.
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country were exposed to every sort of violence.” De Long and Shleifer (1993), Acemoglu et
al. (2005), and van Zanden et al. (2012) show evidence linking political representation with
economic development in historical Europe.
Why did rulers grant local political privileges that protected private property? A stan-
dard answer revolves around warfare. Early modern governments spent large amounts on
the military (Hoffman, 2015, pp. 21-2). Oftentimes, bargaining with well-off urban manufac-
turers and entrepreneurs was an important way for rulers to secure new funds, the “cost” of
which was the granting of local political privileges (Tilly, 1975b, pp. 11, 24, Bates, 2010, pp.
44-6).
The logic of the property rights channel is as follows. Warfare played an important role
in rural-urban migration through the safe harbor effect, and in particular for manufactur-
ers and entrepreneurs. Such migrants could not only move their capital behind the relative
safety of urban fortifications, but could take advantage of local political institutions that pro-
tected private property rights – the granting of which was itself related to military-related
spending needs by rulers. Thus, urban migrants would have greater incentives to make
growth-enhancing investments than otherwise.
2.2.2 Technological Innovation and Human Capital
A second potential channel is through technological innovation. Urban wages were higher
than rural wages in early modern Europe (Voigtla¨nder and Voth, 2013a, p. 780). Thus, urban
manufacturers may have had an incentive to substitute capital for labor through technologi-
cal innovation (Rosenthal and Wong, 2011, p. 105-10). Furthermore, urbanization could pro-
mote the flow of ideas (Bairoch, 1988, p. 336, Mokyr, 1995, pp. 9-10, Glaeser and Joshi-Ghani,
2015, p. xxii). For example, Mokyr (1995, p. 9) writes: “Urban areas, because of the higher
frequency of human interaction, were clearinghouses for ideas and information. . . ” Urban-
ization could also promote human capital accumulation. Glaeser and Joshi-Ghani (2015, p.
xxii) write that “when the workers learn from the people around them, their human capital
increases, and that makes them more productive.” There may be a feedback loop between
greater human capital and the ability to adopt new technology (Acemoglu, 2009, pp. 380-2).
Urban centers in early modern Europe were innovation hubs (Mokyr, 1995, pp. 8-9) and
places of education and learning (Friedrichs, 1995, pp. 259-60, Mokyr, 1995, pp. 10-11, van
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Zanden, 2009, p. 86).3
The logic of the technological innovation channel runs as follows. Warfare was a catalyst
for rural-urban migration via the safe harbor effect, including for relatively skilled manu-
facturers and entrepreneurs. Once in urban centers, such migrants could take advantage
of urbanization, making technological innovation and human capital accumulation more
likely than otherwise.
2.2.3 Economic Agglomeration Effects
A third potential channel is through economic agglomeration effects beyond the flow of
ideas. Urbanization reduces the exchange costs for goods and labor (Glaeser and Joshi-
Ghani, 2015, p. xx). For example, if an input supplier locates near a final goods producer,
then both firms can increase productivity through savings on transportation costs. Similarly,
urbanization promotes an efficient division of labor (Glaeser and Joshi-Ghani, 2015, p. xxi).
Adam Smith (1776, p. 26) writes: “There are some sorts of industry, even of the lowest kind,
which can be carried on no where but a great town.” Finally, urbanization promotes thick
labor markets (Glaeser and Joshi-Ghani, 2015, p. xxi). Urban centers in early modern Europe
displayed diverse occupational structures (Blonde´ and van Damme, 2013, p. 249). Different
sectors of the urban economy were subdivided into numerous specializations (Friedrichs,
1995, pp. 94-5).
The logic of the economic agglomeration channel is as follows. Rural-urban migration
was an important response to warfare through the safe harbor effect, including for manufac-
turers and entrepreneurs. To reduce production costs, urban migrants could take advantage
of economic agglomeration effects. Similarly, to find productive work, such migrants could
take advantage of thick labor markets.4
3According to Mokyr (1995, pp. 14-17), local property rights promoted innovation over the short run, but
reduced it over the long run as local manufacturers established entry barriers to reduce technological com-
petition. Stasavage (2014) shows econometric evidence that supports this argument. Still, even if even if
individual urban centers were captured by a local oligarchy, urban innovation for early modern Europe as a
whole was important (Mokyr, 1995, pp. 17-19). Mokyr (1995, p. 19) writes: “The contribution of the totality of
all European urban centers taken together, however, was enormous, even if each individual unit contributed
only for a limited period of time.”
4Ciccone (2002) finds large economic agglomeration effects in European regions today.
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3 Data
3.1 Current Economic Activity
We gather data on several regional economic outcomes. First, we gather per capita GDP
data at the NUTS 2 level in 2005 from Eurostat (2015).5 To account for differences in price
levels across national borders, we measure the GDP data in purchasing power standard
units (PPS). Second, we gather data on three other regional (i.e., NUTS 2) economic out-
comes: the share of high-technology sector employment in total employment, per capita
R&D expenditures over all sectors (in PPS), and the share of economically active adults in
the total population. Finally, we gather geophysically scaled economic activity data from
Nordhaus (2011). These data measure the “gross cell product” (GCP) for 1-degree longitude
by 1-degree latitude grid cells (i.e., approximately 100 km × 100 km) in 2005. To compute
per capita GCP, we divide the gross cell product by the corresponding grid cell population.
Figure 1 maps per capita GDP by region. We shade regions according to per capita GDP
by quintile, with regions in the top quintile receiving the darkest shade and regions in the
bottom quintile receiving the lightest shade. Per capita GDP tends to be highest in Eu-
rope’s urban belt, the highly urbanized regions that span southern England, Belgium and
the Netherlands, eastern France and western Germany, and northern Italy.
3.2 Historical Warfare
We construct our historical warfare data based on Clodfelter (2002). Clodfelter’s book is
organized into chapters by century (i.e., from 1500 onward) and geographical zone. Within
each chapter, Clodfelter categorizes military conflicts under war headings (e.g., Thirty Years’
War: 1618-48). For each war heading, Clodfelter writes a multiple-paragraph entry which
describes the war’s details. Our unit of analysis is an individual conflict (e.g., battle). To
identify the individual conflicts that comprise each war, we read through each war entry.
Based on this information, we compile a list of all individual conflicts for each war. For ex-
ample, according to Clodfelter, 37 individual conflicts comprise the Thirty Years’ War (Table
A.1). To proxy for conflict locations, we take the settlement (i.e., hamlet, village, town, city)
5NUTS are Eurostat’s standard sub-national units of economic territory. There are three NUTS levels. NUTS
1 units correspond with major socioeconomic regions, NUTS 2 with basic regions, and NUTS 3 with small
regions. GDP data are most widely available at the NUTS 2 level.
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nearest to where each individual conflict took place. Our database includes all individual
conflicts fought on land in Europe during the early modern era (i.e., between 1500 and 1799),
which Parker (1996, p. 1) calls an “unusually belligerent” era.6
To measure regional exposure to historical warfare, we adapt the “market potential”
measure of Harris (1954). The historical conflict exposure of region i is defined as
∑
c∈C
(1+ distancei,c)−1,
where distancei,c is measured from the centroid of region i to the location of conflict c (in
100s of km). The set C includes all conflicts between 1500-1799. The underlying logic is
that a region’s exposure to a particular conflict is increasing in the conflict’s proximity to the
region. This measure has at least two advantages over other potential measures. First, this
measure does not rely on an arbitrary cutoff distance beyond which a conflict is assumed
to have no influence. Rather, it incorporates information from all conflicts. Second, the
weight assigned to each conflict is bounded between zero and one, reducing the measure’s
sensitivity to any single conflict.7 To facilitate the interpretation of the regression coefficients,
we normalize historical conflict exposure to have a mean of zero and a variance of one.
Figure 2 maps historical conflict exposure by region (NUTS 2). Regions are shaded ac-
cording to conflict exposure by quintile, with regions in the top quintile receiving the darkest
shade and regions in the bottom quintile receiving the lightest shade. This figure suggests
that historical conflict exposure is highest in Europe’s urban belt. To complement this fig-
ure, Table 1 lists the top 35 regions ranked by historical conflict exposure. The top-ranked
regions for historical conflict exposure are typically located in Belgium, the Netherlands,
eastern France, western Germany, and northern Italy.
Taken together, Figure 1 and Figure 2 indicate that there is is a positive spatial correlation
between historical conflict exposure and regional economic development today. However,
there could be omitted confounding factors that drive the spatial variation in both historical
6According to Onorato et al. (2014), there was a fundamental change in the nature of warfare over the 1800s
due to 1) technological improvements in transportation and communications and 2) the emergence of the
mass army.
7If each conflict were instead weighted by distance−1i,c , then a region where a conflict location is very close to
its centroid would be assigned a very large conflict exposure value, irrespective of the region’s proximity to
other conflicts.
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warfare and current per capita GDP. To determine whether historical conflict exposure ac-
tually affects long-run regional economic development, we now undertake an econometric
analysis.
4 Empirical Strategy and Main Results
4.1 Empirical Strategy
The linear specification that we estimate is
Yi,j = βCi,j + X′i,jφ+ µj + ei,j, (1)
where Yi,j is economic activity for region i in country j, Ci,j is our measure of historical con-
flict exposure, Xi,j is a vector of benchmark controls to be described, µj is the fixed effect of
country j, and ei,j is the error term. Let Zj = (Z1,j, . . . , Znj,j) denote the vector of regional
covariates Z for country j, where nj is the number of regions in country j. Under strict exo-
geneity, E(ei,j | Cj, Xj, µj) = 0, the coefficient β represents the change in average economic
activity today due to a one standard deviation increase in historical conflict exposure, hold-
ing the other covariates constant.
The vector Xi,j denotes the set of benchmark controls. We focus on “good” controls (An-
grist and Pischke, 2009, p. 64) that are unlikely to be influenced by post-1500 developments.
To account for initial regional demographic conditions, we proxy for regional population
density in 1500.8 To account for regional geographic features, we include binary variables
that take the value 1 for regions that have primary rivers, are landlocked (i.e., no ocean or
sea access), or were Roman road hubs.9 We also account for average elevation above sea
level, terrain ruggedness, and land quality.10 Finally, we always account for average dis-
8We take the demographic data from Bosker et al. (2013), who truncate all city populations in 1500 of less than
5,000 inhabitants at zero. To proxy for regional population density, we aggregate city populations by region
(NUTS 2) and divide by the region’s area. To include all observations, we add one before taking the log of
this variable.
9The primary rivers data are from European Environment Agency (2009), the landlockedness data are from
Natural Earth (2015), and the Roman road hubs data are from Touring Club Italiano (1989).
10The elevation and ruggedness data are from Nunn and Puga (2012). These data are available for grid cells
of roughly 1 km × 1 km. The land quality data are from Ramankutty et al. (2002). These data calculate the
probability that a grid cell (of roughly 55 km × 40 km) can be cultivated based on local climate and soil
conditions. For each variable, we average data values across all grid cells within each region.
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tance from the region centroid to the nearest sovereign border of a historical polity over the
1500-1799 period. We include this control because proximity to historical borders may be
linked with greater conflict exposure on one hand and greater interstate trade on the other.
To reproduce historical sovereign borders, we digitize the maps in McEvedy (1972) for all
available years in and around the early modern era (i.e., 1483, 1600, 1681, 1783). We calculate
the distance between each region’s centroid and the nearest border of a historical polity for
each map year and then average across map years.
We take three approaches to statistical inference. First, we report standard errors robust
to clustering at the country level. Second, we report the p-value of the test of β using the
wild cluster bootstrap. Because there are only 22 countries in our sample, the number of
clusters is small, and tests based on analytical cluster-robust standard errors can over-reject
in practice. Following Cameron et al. (2008), we use the wild cluster bootstrap to achieve a
test of correct size in the presence of clustering. The bootstrap is based on 10,000 replications.
Third, we report the p-value of the test using Conley (1999) standard errors that allow for
general forms of spatial autocorrelation of the error term. The Conley standard errors use a
cutoff distance of approximately 1,500 kilometers, beyond which spatial autocorrelation is
assumed to be zero.11
Table A.2 presents the summary statistics for the regression variables.
4.2 Main Results
Table 2 presents our estimates for the relationship between historical conflict exposure and
log regional per capita GDP. Column 1 reports the results for the specification that controls
for country fixed effects and average distance to the nearest polity. The estimated coeffi-
cient is positive and statistically significant at the one percent level according to all three
hypothesis tests. Column 2 adds the geographic controls. The point estimate and statistical
significance are virtually unchanged. Column 3 adds log population density in 1500. The
point estimate falls slightly but remains large and highly statistically significant according
to all three hypothesis tests.
Overall, the results in Table 2 support the argument for the economic legacy of histor-
ical warfare. The point estimates suggest that a one standard deviation increase in his-
11The results are very similar in magnitude and significance if we use different cutoff values.
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torical conflict exposure predicts an increase in regional per capita GDP today of 17 to 20
percent. For perspective, this magnitude corresponds to the difference in per capita GDP
between Tu¨bingen (a region in the southwestern German state of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg) and
Schleswig-Holstein (a region in the eponymous northern German state).
5 Instrumental Variables
5.1 Young Rulers
The results in Table 2 display a positive and significant relationship between historical con-
flict exposure and regional economic development today. Though we control for a wide
range of regional and national features, it is still possible that omitted factors that affect both
historical warfare and current development bias our results. To address this possibility, we
pursue an instrumental variables strategy.
To instrument for historical conflict exposure, we use the historical presence of a young
ruler (i.e., under the age of 16).12 The underlying logic is as follows. By virtue of governing
inexperience, a young ruler is more likely than a mature ruler to be vulnerable to attack by
nearby states which hope to exploit this weakness. Similarly, a young ruler is more likely to
initiate conflict with nearby states due to his governing inexperience (e.g., to overcompen-
sate). Overall, this logic suggests that historical conflict exposure will increase in regions
near the sovereign borders of the young ruler’s polity. To avoid any endogeneity concerns,
we do not count any case in which the young ruler took the throne in response to the previ-
ous ruler’s assassination or battle death, which could have been premeditated.
We now offer an example to illustrate this logic. King Henry II of France died of a head
wound from jousting in 1559. His heir, Francis II, took the throne at the age of 15 (under the
guardianship of Catherine de Medici). After surviving a coup attempt, France II died from
health complications in 1560 after 17 months on the throne. He was succeeded by his 10-year
old brother, Charles IX. Hale (1985, p. 18) argues that the political instability surrounding the
12In a somewhat similar manner, Dube and Harish (2015) and Acharya and Lee (2016) exploit historical heir
data in Europe. Dube and Harish focus on the 1480-1913 period. They instrument for historical queenly
rule with the presence of 1) a male first-born child and 2) a sister, finding that queens were more likely to
participate in interstate wars. Acharya and Lee focus on male heirs between 1000 and 1500. They argue that
a lack of heirs promoted succession disputes, which weakened state institutions and reduced the prospects
for long-run economic growth. They find a negative relationship between the historical likelihood of male
heirs and regional economic development today at the NUTS 1 level (i.e., major socioeconomic regions).
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reigns of the young rulers Francis II and Charles IX was an important cause of the outbreak
of the first French War of Religion in 1562.
5.2 IV Data
To identify the historical presence of young rulers, we gather political dynasty data from
Hansen (2006). For each listed polity in early modern Europe, we record the name of each
ruler, the start and end years of each reign, the cause of each death (i.e., accidental, assas-
sination, in battle, or natural causes), and whether each ruler took the throne before the
age of 16, which we define as “young.” As described above, we do not count any case in
which a young ruler took the throne as result of the previous ruler’s assassination or battle
death. There are 57 cases of young rulers according to these criteria in our sample. Out of
these cases, two took the throne following accidental deaths while the others took the throne
following death by natural causes.13
The incidence of young rulers varies at the level of the historical polity. To construct an
instrument that varies at the region level (NUTS 2), we weight the historical presence of each
young ruler according to the region’s proximity to the young ruler’s historical sovereign
borders. The underlying logic is that historical exposure to the effect of young rulers is
increasing in proximity to the sovereign borders of his historical polity, where conflict is
most likely to occur. We again use the maps in McEvedy (1972) to identify the locations of
historical polity borders.
Region i’s exposure to young rulers is
1799
∑
t=1500
∑
p∈P
YoungRulerp,t × (1+ distancei,p,t)−1.
The set P contains all historical polities in Europe between 1500 and 1799. YoungRulerp,t
equals one if a young ruler took the throne in historical polity p and year t, and zero oth-
erwise. The variable distancei,p,t is measured from the centroid of region i to the nearest
sovereign border of polity p in year t (in 100s of km). We measure distance in year t accord-
ing to the McEvedy map that most accurately reflects the historical sovereign borders at that
13For robustness, we constructed a second instrument based on accidental ruler deaths. However, there were
only 18 such cases in our sample. The IV estimates for the second instrument are very similar to the Table 3
estimates, but slightly less precise.
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time. If multiple maps are available, then we use the most recent map drawn prior to year t.
We normalize the instrument to have a mean of zero and a variance of one.
5.3 IV Results
The two-stage least squares specification that we estimate is
Yi,j = βCi,j + X′i,jφ+ µj + ei,j (2a)
Ci,j = pi IVi,j + X′i,jα+ ηj + υi,j, (2b)
where IVi,j is historical exposure to young rulers. We include in Xi,j the same set of bench-
mark controls as in the OLS analysis. The parameter of interest, β, is identified under strict
exogeneity of the instrument and the control variables: E(ei,j | IVj, Xj, µj) = 0. Intuitively,
this condition embodies two assumptions about the instrument. First, the instrument is
mean independent of unobserved determinants of long-run regional economic develop-
ment. Second, the instrument only affects regional economic development through histori-
cal conflict exposure, such that the instrument does not reside in the regression error of the
structural equation, ei,j.
Table 3 presents the results of the IV analysis. The top panel reports the results of the
first-stage regression. The first-stage coefficient estimate is stable across different specifi-
cations of the control variables. A one standard deviation increase in historical exposure
to young rulers predicts an increase in historical conflict exposure of 0.628 to 0.635 standard
deviations. This coefficient is always highly significant. The bottom panel reports the results
of the second-stage regression. In addition to the standard statistics, we report the p-value
from the Anderson and Rubin (1949) chi-squared test of the significance of the estimated co-
efficient on historical conflict exposure. This test is based on the reduced-form equation and
is robust to the presence of weak instruments under the assumption that the instruments are
valid. We also report the Wald rk F statistic in Kleibergen and Paap (2006). This F statistic
ranges from 69 to 194, indicating that the instrument is strong. The second-stage coefficient
estimates are always statistically significant and quantitatively similar to the OLS estimates.
The IV results suggest that a one standard deviation increase in historical conflict exposure
increases regional per capita GDP today by 19 to 20 percent.
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5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
The IV results rely on the assumption that the exclusion restriction holds exactly. However,
our instrument may only be “plausibly exogenous” (Conley et al., 2012) in the sense that the
exclusion restriction only holds approximately. Formally speaking, in the following system
of equations
Yi,j = βCi,j + X′i,jφ+ γIVi,j + µj + ei,j (3a)
Ci,j = pi IVi,j + X′i,jα+ ηj + υi,j, (3b)
we assume so far that γ = 0. Yet what if γ is near zero but not exactly equal to it? We test the
robustness of our IV estimates to violations of the exclusion restriction according to Conley
et al. (2012). We employ the most conservative procedure, specifying a range of values that
γ can take without assuming any value is more likely than another. For a given δ > 0, we
construct a conservative 95 percent confidence interval for β that allows for γ ∈ [−δ, δ].
Figure 3 presents the results of this exercise. The dotted line gives the value of the bench-
mark IV estimate under exogeneity as a reference point. The dashed lines represent the
upper and lower bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval for β for each value of δ. We
can reject the null of β = 0 at the 5 percent level for |δ| ≤ 0.026, meaning that our instru-
ment would need to have a direct partial effect of more than 0.026 in order for us to conclude
that β is statistically indistinguishable from zero (at the 5 percent level). To put this effect
into context, it is 13 percent of the benchmark IV estimate of β (0.199) and 15 percent of
the benchmark OLS estimate (0.171). Thus, the results of this exercise indicate that the IV
estimates are robust to moderate violations of the exclusion restriction.
6 Propensity Score Weighting
Historical warfare may have a non-linear effect on regional economic development. Fur-
thermore, if initial demographic conditions and regional geographic features enter into the
true outcome equation in a non-linear manner, then the original linear specification may
not fully account for their influence. To address such concerns, we relax the assumption
that the conditional expectation of Yi,j is linear in Ci,j and Xi,j. Following Cattaneo (2010),
we estimate the “treatment” effects of conflict exposure in a semi-parametric environment.
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Cattaneo’s framework allows the treatment variable to take a finite number of values. For
our sample, it is feasible to allow the treatment variable to take three values as defined by
the terciles of historical conflict exposure. Regions in the first tercile have historical conflict
exposure of less than −0.315, regions in the second tercile between −0.315 and 0.515, and
regions in the third tercile of greater than 0.515.14
Following Cattaneo (2010), let t ∈ T index treatment levels (i.e., conflict exposure ter-
ciles), where T = {1, 2, 3}. For t ∈ T , let the random variables Y(t) denote the potential
economic outcomes under each treatment level. Let T ∈ T indicate which treatment level
was actually received, and let Dt = 1{T = t} indicate receipt of treatment level t ∈ T .
Suppose that the vector X contains observable covariates such as the controls described in
Section 4.1. The key assumption for identification is
Assumption 1. For all t ∈ T :
(i) Y(t) ⊥ Dt | X and
(ii) 0 < pmin ≤ P(T = t | X).
Part (i) of this assumption states that the potential economic outcomes are independent
of the treatment level after conditioning on the observables in X. Part (ii) states that, for each
subpopulation defined by values of X, the probability of receiving each treatment level is not
too small. Following Cattaneo (2010), we exploit Assumption 1 using an inverse probability
weighting scheme based on the generalized propensity score, p∗t (X) = P(T = t | X), where
we estimate the generalized propensity score by multinomial logit.
Table 4 displays the results of this analysis.15 Column 1 uses a covariate set X that in-
cludes only average distance to the nearest polity, while column 2 adds the regional geo-
graphic controls, and column 3 adds log population density in 1500. The first row reports
the average treatment effect (ATE) of being in the second tercile of historical conflict expo-
sure as compared to being in the first. Similarly, the second row reports the ATE of being
in the third tercile of historical conflict exposure as compared to being in the first. The ATE
of being in the third tercile as compared to being in the second is the difference between
14For example, the region that includes the community of Madrid (Spain) falls into the first tercile, the region
that includes greater Manchester (United Kingdom) falls into the second, and the region of Lombardy (Italy)
falls into the third.
15The sample size falls by 13 due to the trimming of observations with small estimated propensity scores.
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the second-row estimate and the first-row estimate. Median conflict exposure is −1.120 in
the first tercile, 0.071 in the second tercile, and 1.034 in the third tercile. Thus, moving from
the median value of conflict exposure within one tercile to the median value within the next
tercile always corresponds to an increase in conflict exposure of approximately one, which
is the standard deviation of conflict exposure. This fact facilitates comparison of the effects
estimated in Table 4 to those in Tables 2 and 3. The ATE of being in the second tercile as
compared to being in the first ranges from 0.172 (when conditioning on the full set of co-
variates) to 0.342. The ATE of being in the third tercile as compared to being in the second
ranges from 0.231 to 0.301. All estimated treatment effects are highly statistically significant.
Overall, the results of this exercise support our main results. First, the estimated effect
of historical conflict exposure is similar to the OLS and IV estimates. In particular, when
conditioning on the full set of covariates, the estimates imply that a one standard deviation
increase in conflict exposure roughly translates into a 17 to 23 percent increase in regional
per capita GDP. The corresponding effect implied by the OLS and IV estimates ranges from
17 to 20 percent. Second, the economic effect of historical conflict exposure appears to be
approximately linear. The ATE of moving from the first to the second tercile of conflict
exposure (17 percent) is relatively similar to the ATE of moving from the second to the third
tercile (23 percent). We interpret this result as a validation of our original linear specification.
7 Further Robustness
7.1 Region Fixed Effects
Our econometric models always include country fixed effects. However, there may be un-
observed factors at the regional level that may bias our results. As another way besides the
IV approach to account for omitted variable bias, we estimate the original linear specifica-
tion with fixed effects at the NUTS 1 regional level (i.e., major socioeconomic regions). Our
sample has 90 NUTS 1 regions.16
Table 5 presents the results for regional fixed effects. The point estimates are similar
to the main estimates, ranging from 0.15 to 0.25. The estimated coefficients are statistically
significant across all three specifications. This exercise indicates that our results are relatively
16For example, France has 8 domestic NUTS 1 regions (e.g., Paris Basin) and 22 domestic NUTS 2 regions.
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insensitive to controlling for fixed effects at the regional (versus country) level.
7.2 Alternative Samples
7.2.1 Exclude Urban Belt
Europe’s urban belt may have special features – for example, rich agricultural conditions
and easy waterway access – that promoted both historical warfare and regional economic
development.17 To test whether the urban belt drives our results, we exclude the 50-plus
regions that comprise this belt.18 Figure 4 maps the urban belt regions that we exclude (dark
shading).
Table 6 presents the results when we exclude the urban belt. The point estimates are
similar to, and slightly smaller than, the main estimates, ranging from 0.16 to 0.19. The es-
timated coefficients are statistically significant across all specifications and hypothesis tests
except for one (i.e., column 1, wild cluster bootstrap). This exercise indicates that some
special feature of the urban belt does not drive our results.
7.2.2 Exclude Regions One by One
To test whether our results are sensitive to any outlier region, we exclude regions one by one.
Figure 5 displays the results of this exercise for the most stringent main specification (i.e.,
column 3 of Table 2). The point estimates and confidence intervals are remarkably stable
across samples. This exercise indicates that no single outlier region drives our results.
7.2.3 Exclude Capitals
To test whether capital city status influences our results, Table 7 excludes all regions that
contain current sovereign capitals, of which there are nearly 30. The coefficient estimates are
very similar in magnitude and significance to the main results.
17For example, Motamed et al. (2014) find that high agricultural potential and low transportation costs promote
urbanization. Andersen et al. (2015) show that the adoption of the heavy plow in medieval Europe led to
greater urbanization in regions with clay soils. Iyigun et al. (2010) find a negative relationship between the
introduction of the potato in European regions suitable to its cultivation and violent conflict.
18Namely, we exclude all regions in southeastern England, Belgium, the Netherlands, northern Italy, and along
the French-German border. Furthermore, we exclude Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, and all regions in Switzer-
land. However, 1) Liechtenstein and Luxembourg play no role in the fixed-effects analysis because each
polity has only one NUTS 2 region and 2) Switzerland is already excluded from this analysis due to missing
data for regional per capita GDP.
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7.2.4 Conflict Types
Battles and sieges account for over 90 percent of historical conflicts in our sample (i.e., 350
battles and 247 sieges). To test whether conflict types influence our results, Table 8 restricts
the conflict sample to battles only (top panel) or sieges only (bottom panel). The estimated
coefficients remain statistically significant across all specifications. The point estimates for
historical battle exposure are very similar to the main results, while the point estimates for
historical siege exposure are slightly smaller. Furthermore, the estimates remain similar to
the main results in magnitude and significance if we test historical conflict exposure sepa-
rately for 1500-99, 1600-99, or 1700-99 (results not shown).
7.3 Alternative Outcomes
Table 9 presents the estimates for the alternative regional economic outcomes: population
density, the share of high-tech employment, per capita R&D spending, and the share of
economically active adults. The estimated coefficients are positive across all four outcomes
above and are statistically significant according to every hypothesis test across the first three
outcomes listed above.
Table 10 presents the estimates for geophysically scaled economic activity (Nordhaus,
2011). The results for historical conflict exposure are again very similar to the main results.19
8 Channels
The evidence shown in Sections 4 to 7 supports our argument that the economic legacy of
historical warfare is significant. This section tests potential channels through which histori-
cal war-related urbanization can translate into long-run regional economic development.
Following the conceptual framework in Section 2, we focus on three potential channels
for which historical data are available: property rights protection, human capital accumu-
lation, and economic agglomeration effects. To operationalize these channels, we rely on
Tabellini (2010), who constructs historical data at the “macro” regional level for eight coun-
tries.20 To proxy for past property rights protection, we use the constraints on the executive
19We measure all explanatory variables in Table 10 in the same manner as for the NUTS 2 regions, except now
the regional unit is a 100 km× 100 km grid cell (i.e., approximately 1-degree longitude by 1-degree latitude).
20Tabellini’s regions are larger than NUTS 2 regions but do not correspond exactly with NUTS 1 regions. His
sample countries are France, Germany (excluding East Germany), Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain,
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for regional political institutions in 1850. As described in Section 2, this measure captures
the intimate relationship between property rights institutions and political institutions (Ace-
moglu and Johnson, 2005). To proxy for past human capital accumulation, we use the liter-
acy rate in 1880, defined as the share of the regional population who could read and write.
Finally, to proxy for past economic agglomeration effects, we use the urbanization rate in
1850, defined as the share of the regional population that lived in cities with more than
30,000 inhabitants.
We estimate the equation
Mt,j = βCt,j + X′t,jφ+ µj + et,j, (4)
where Mt,j is one of the three channels for Tabellini’s region t, Ct,j measures historical conflict
exposure according to the method described in Section 3.2, Xt,j is a vector of regional controls
that mimics the set of benchmark controls in Equation 1, µj is the fixed effect for country j,
and et,j is the error term.
Table 11 presents the results of this exercise. There is a positive relationship between his-
torical conflict exposure and each channel for the most stringent specifications (i.e., columns
3, 6, and 9). However, only the point estimate in the literacy equation is statistically sig-
nificant according to all three hypothesis tests. We interpret these results with caution,
because the number of regions for which Tabellini’s data are available is relatively small
(i.e., 65 observations) and differs from the main sample. Still, with respect to the conceptual
framework, this evidence suggests that human capital accumulation stands out as one chan-
nel through which war-related urbanization translated into regional economic development
over the long run.
9 Conclusion
This paper shows new evidence about the military origins of regional economic prosperity
in Europe. Warfare was a fundamental feature of European history. We argue that, to reduce
the costs of warfare, rural inhabitants relocated behind the relative safety of urban fortifica-
tions. War-related urbanization, in turn, had positive consequences for long-run economic
development.
Portugal, and the United Kingdom.
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To test our argument, we perform an empirical analysis on a new sub-national database
that spans the early modern era to the present day. We show evidence that the economic
legacy of historical warfare is significant. There is a positive, large, and significant rela-
tionship between historical conflict exposure and current regional economic development.
This result is robust to a wide range of econometric techniques, alternative samples, and
economic outcomes. Human capital accumulation stands out one channel that mediates the
relationship between historical war-related urbanization and long-run regional economic
development.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper represents the first systematic analysis of the
military origins of Europe’s wealthy urban belt. However, our results do not imply that
the legacy of historical warfare is always positive. Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014), Fearon
and Laitin (2014), and Dincecco et al. (2015) show evidence that the conflict legacy in Sub-
Saharan Africa is negative. There is a significant relationship between historical warfare and
civil conflict today. To better understand the factors that explain why the legacy of historical
warfare differs across various parts of the world, further study is required.
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Table 1: Highest Historical Conflict Exposure by Region (NUTS 2)
ID Region Country Conflict Exposure
BE32 Prov. Hainaut Belgium 2.00
BE31 Prov. Brabant Wallon Belgium 1.91
BE10 Re´gion de Bruxelles-Capitale Belgium 1.88
BE24 Prov. Vlaams-Brabant Belgium 1.84
BE23 Prov. Oost-Vlaanderen Belgium 1.80
BE35 Prov. Namur Belgium 1.80
FR30 Nord-Pas-de-Calais France 1.73
BE25 Prov. West-Vlaanderen Belgium 1.72
BE21 Prov. Antwerpen Belgium 1.70
BE22 Prov. Limburg Belgium 1.68
BE33 Prov. Lie`ge Belgium 1.66
BE34 Prov. Luxembourg Belgium 1.58
NL34 Zeeland Netherlands 1.57
NL42 Limburg Netherlands 1.52
DEB3 Rheinhessen-Pfalz Germany 1.51
NL41 Noord-Brabant Netherlands 1.50
DE12 Karlsruhe Germany 1.47
DEB2 Trier Germany 1.47
FR22 Picardie France 1.46
DEA2 Ko¨ln Germany 1.45
DEC0 Saarland Germany 1.44
DEB1 Koblenz Germany 1.43
DE71 Darmstadt Germany 1.39
DEA1 Du¨sseldorf Germany 1.38
DE13 Freiburg Germany 1.35
FR42 Alsace France 1.35
NL33 Zuid-Holland Netherlands 1.35
DE11 Stuttgart Germany 1.32
ITC4 Lombardia Italy 1.31
FR41 Lorraine France 1.29
DE72 Gießen Germany 1.28
DE14 Tu¨bingen Germany 1.26
NL31 Utrecht Netherlands 1.25
FR10 Iˆle France France 1.23
FR21 Champagne-Ardenne France 1.22
Notes. Historical conflict exposure of region i is ∑c∈C(1 + distancei,c)−1, normalized to have mean zero and
variance one. The set C includes all conflicts between 1500-1799. distancei,c is the distance from the centroid of
region i to the location of conflict c (in 100s of km).
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Table 2: Economic Legacy of Warfare: Main Results
Dependent variable: Log GDP per capita, 2005
(1) (2) (3)
Conflict exposure, 1500-1799 0.203 0.200 0.171
(0.058) (0.071) (0.063)
[0.002] [0.011] [0.013]
Avg. dist. to nearest polity Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls No Yes Yes
Log population density, 1500 No No Yes
Wild cluster bootstrap p-value 0.006 0.003 0.005
Conley p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.141 0.148 0.359
Number of clusters 22 22 22
Observations 261 261 261
Notes. Estimates are obtained by ordinary least squares, using country fixed effects. Log GDP per capita is mea-
sured in purchasing power standard units (PPS). The geographic controls are primary rivers, landlockedness,
Roman road hubs, elevation, ruggedness, and land quality. Robust standard errors clustered at the country
level are in parentheses, followed by corresponding p-values in brackets. We report the p-values correspond-
ing to tests of the conflict coefficient using the wild cluster bootstrap (to account for the small number of
clusters) and Conley (1999) standard errors (to account for spatial autocorrelation). The wild cluster bootstrap
p-values are based on 10,000 replications. The Conley standard errors use a cutoff distance of approximately
1,500 kilometers, beyond which spatial correlation is assumed to be zero.
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Table 3: Economic Legacy of Warfare: IV Results
First Stage: Conflict exposure, 1500-1799
(1) (2) (3)
Exposure to young rulers, 1500-1799 0.635 0.628 0.628
(0.076) (0.046) (0.045)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Avg. dist. to nearest polity Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls No Yes Yes
Log population density, 1500 No No Yes
Conley p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.770 0.778 0.782
Number of clusters 22 22 22
Observations 261 261 261
Second Stage: Log GDP per capita, 2005
(1) (2) (3)
Conflict exposure, 1500-1799 0.199 0.195 0.199
(0.067) (0.092) (0.087)
[0.003] [0.034] [0.023]
Avg. dist. to nearest polity Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls No Yes Yes
Log population density, 1500 No No Yes
Conley p-value 0.001 0.011 0.002
Anderson-Rubin p-value 0.021 0.051 0.036
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic 69.4 185.1 193.8
Number of clusters 22 22 22
Observations 261 261 261
Notes. The first panel shows the first-stage estimates from regressing historical conflict exposure on histori-
cal exposure to young rulers. The second panel shows the second-stage estimates of the effect of historical
conflict exposure on regional per capita GDP, using historical exposure to young rulers to instrument for his-
torical conflict exposure. Log GDP per capita is measured in purchasing power standard units (PPS). The
geographic controls are primary rivers, landlockedness, Roman road hubs, elevation, ruggedness, and land
quality. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses, followed by corresponding p-
values in brackets. We report the p-value corresponding to tests of the conflict coefficient using Conley (1999)
standard errors (to account for spatial autocorrelation). The Conley standard errors use a cutoff distance of
approximately 1,500 kilometers, beyond which spatial correlation is assumed to be zero. We report the p-value
from the Anderson and Rubin (1949) test of the conflict coefficient on conflict, which is robust to the presence
of weak instruments. Finally, we report the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) Wald rk F statistic for the excluded
instrument.
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Table 4: Economic Legacy of Warfare: Inverse-Probability Weighting
Dependent variable: Log GDP per capita, 2005
(1) (2) (3)
ATE of 2nd vs. 1st tercile 0.293 0.342 0.172
(0.095) (0.093) (0.069)
[0.002] [0.000] [0.012]
ATE of 3rd vs. 1st tercile 0.594 0.639 0.403
(0.106) (0.113) (0.061)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
ATE of 3rd vs. 2nd tercile p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 248 248 248
Notes. Estimates are obtained by augmented inverse probability weighting following Cattaneo (2010). Log
GDP per capita is measured in purchasing power standard units (PPS). Standard errors are in parentheses,
followed by corresponding p-values in brackets. The first row gives the average treatment effect (ATE) of being
in the second tercile of conflict exposure compared to being in the first. The second row gives the ATE of being
in the third tercile of conflict exposure compared to being in the first. We report the p-value corresponding
to the test of the ATE of being in the third tercile of conflict compared to being in the second. The propensity
scores are estimated by multinomial logit using different sets of covariates. Column 1 uses average distance
to the nearest polity in the multinomial logit regressions, while column 2 adds the geographic controls and
column 3 adds log population density in 1500. 13 observations were trimmed from the sample due to their
small estimated propensity scores.
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Table 5: Economic Legacy of Warfare: Region Fixed Effects (NUTS 1)
Dependent variable: Log GDP per capita, 2005
(1) (2) (3)
Conflict exposure, 1500-1799 0.247 0.227 0.147
(0.094) (0.099) (0.087)
[0.010] [0.024] [0.094]
Avg. dist. to nearest polity Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls No Yes Yes
Log population density, 1500 No No Yes
Wild cluster bootstrap p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Conley p-value 0.018 0.039 0.073
R2 0.048 0.060 0.294
Number of clusters 90 90 90
Observations 261 261 261
Notes. Estimates are obtained by ordinary least squares, using NUTS 1 region fixed effects. Log GDP per
capita is measured in purchasing power standard units (PPS). The geographic controls are primary rivers,
landlockedness, Roman road hubs, elevation, ruggedness, and land quality. Robust standard errors clustered
at the NUTS 1 region level are in parentheses, followed by corresponding p-values in brackets. We report the
p-values corresponding to tests of the conflict coefficient using the wild cluster bootstrap (to account for the
small number of clusters) and Conley (1999) standard errors (to account for spatial autocorrelation). The wild
cluster bootstrap p-values are based on 10,000 replications. The Conley standard errors use a cutoff distance
of approximately 1,500 kilometers, beyond which spatial correlation is assumed to be zero.
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Table 6: Economic Legacy of Warfare: Exclude Urban Belt
Dependent variable: Log GDP per capita, 2005
(1) (2) (3)
Conflict exposure, 1500–1799 0.177 0.185 0.164
(0.048) (0.055) (0.053)
[0.002] [0.003] [0.006]
Avg. dist. to nearest polity Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls No Yes Yes
Log population density, 1500 No No Yes
Wild cluster bootstrap p-value 0.121 0.029 0.040
Conley p-value 0.001 0.000 0.000
R2 0.126 0.134 0.262
Number of clusters 20 20 20
Observations 205 205 205
Notes. Sample excludes all regions that are located within urban belt according to Figure 4. Estimates are ob-
tained by ordinary least squares, using country fixed effects. Log GDP per capita is measured in purchasing
power standard units (PPS). The geographic controls are primary rivers, landlockedness, Roman road hubs,
elevation, ruggedness, and land quality. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in paren-
theses, followed by corresponding p-values in brackets. We report the p-values corresponding to tests of the
conflict coefficient using the wild cluster bootstrap (to account for the small number of clusters) and Conley
(1999) standard errors (to account for spatial autocorrelation). The wild cluster bootstrap p-values are based
on 10,000 replications. The Conley standard errors use a cutoff distance of approximately 1,500 kilometers,
beyond which spatial correlation is assumed to be zero.
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Table 7: Economic Legacy of Warfare: Exclude Sovereign Capitals
Dependent variable: Log GDP per capita, 2005
(1) (2) (3)
Conflict exposure, 1500–1799 0.176 0.186 0.161
(0.070) (0.067) (0.063)
[0.021] [0.013] [0.020]
Avg. dist. to nearest polity Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls No Yes Yes
Log population density, 1500 No No Yes
Wild cluster bootstrap p-value 0.009 0.001 0.002
Conley p-value 0.001 0.000 0.002
R2 0.211 0.256 0.330
Number of clusters 19 19 19
Observations 234 234 234
Notes. Sample excludes all regions that contain current sovereign capitals. Estimates are obtained by ordinary
least squares, using country fixed effects. Log GDP per capita is measured in purchasing power standard units
(PPS). The geographic controls are primary rivers, landlockedness, Roman road hubs, elevation, ruggedness,
and land quality. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses, followed by corre-
sponding p-values in brackets. We report the p-values corresponding to tests of the conflict coefficient using
the wild cluster bootstrap (to account for the small number of clusters) and Conley (1999) standard errors (to
account for spatial autocorrelation). The wild cluster bootstrap p-values are based on 10,000 replications. The
Conley standard errors use a cutoff distance of approximately 1,500 kilometers, beyond which spatial correla-
tion is assumed to be zero.
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Table 8: Economic Legacy of Warfare: Conflict Types
Dependent variable: Log GDP per capita, 2005
(1) (2) (3)
Battle exposure, 1500-1799 0.202 0.206 0.182
(0.052) (0.069) (0.062)
[0.001] [0.007] [0.008]
Avg. dist. to nearest polity Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls No Yes Yes
Log population density, 1500 No No Yes
Wild cluster bootstrap p-value 0.009 0.005 0.009
Conley p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.142 0.150 0.364
Number of clusters 22 22 22
Observations 261 261 261
Dependent variable: Log GDP per capita, 2005
(1) (2) (3)
Siege exposure, 1500-1799 0.178 0.166 0.136
(0.065) (0.070) (0.061)
[0.012] [0.028] [0.038]
Avg. dist. to nearest polity Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls No Yes Yes
Log population density, 1500 No No Yes
Wild cluster bootstrap p-value 0.011 0.006 0.009
Conley p-value 0.001 0.002 0.007
R2 0.119 0.129 0.342
Number of clusters 22 22 22
Observations 261 261 261
Notes. Estimates are obtained by ordinary least squares, including country fixed effects. Log GDP per capita
is measured in purchasing power standard units (PPS). The geographic controls are primary rivers, land-
lockedness, Roman road hubs, elevation, ruggedness, and land quality. Robust standard errors clustered at
the country level are in parentheses, followed by corresponding p-values in brackets. We report the p-values
corresponding to tests of the conflict coefficient using the wild cluster bootstrap (to account for the small num-
ber of clusters) and Conley (1999) standard errors (to account for spatial autocorrelation). The wild cluster
bootstrap p-values are based on 10,000 replications. The Conley standard errors use a cutoff distance of ap-
proximately 1,500 kilometers, beyond which spatial correlation is assumed to be zero.
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Table 9: Economic Legacy of Warfare: Alternative Outcomes
Dep. variable: Log population High-tech Log R&D spending Economically active
density, 2005 employment, 2005 per capita, 2005 population, 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Conflict 0.857 0.762 0.692 1.468 1.050 1.018 0.705 0.586 0.553 3.019 2.420 2.354
(0.357) (0.236) (0.232) (0.248) (0.240) (0.232) (0.133) (0.226) (0.227) (1.282) (1.588) (1.587)
[0.028] [0.005] [0.008] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.019] [0.026] [0.031] [0.146] [0.156]
Dist. to polity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geog. controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Pop. dens. 1500 No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Bootstrap p-val. 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.018 0.151 0.767 0.813
Conley p-value 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.031 0.039
R2 0.093 0.272 0.386 0.113 0.154 0.164 0.108 0.137 0.175 0.103 0.140 0.150
# clusters 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Observations 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171
Notes. Estimates are obtained by ordinary least squares, including country fixed effects. Log R&D spending is measured in purchasing power
standard units (PPS). The geographic controls are primary rivers, landlockedness, Roman road hubs, elevation, ruggedness, and land quality.
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses, followed by corresponding p-values in brackets. We report the p-
values corresponding to tests of the conflict coefficient using the wild cluster bootstrap (to account for the small number of clusters) and
Conley (1999) standard errors (to account for spatial autocorrelation). The wild cluster bootstrap p-values are based on 10,000 replications. The
Conley standard errors use a cutoff distance of approximately 1,500 kilometers, beyond which spatial correlation is assumed to be zero.
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Table 10: Economic Legacy of Warfare: Gross Cell Product
Dependent variable: Log GCP per capita, 2005
(1) (2) (3)
Conflict exposure, 1500–1799 0.182 0.188 0.181
(0.066) (0.058) (0.059)
[0.010] [0.003] [0.005]
Avg. dist. to nearest polity Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls No Yes Yes
Log population density, 1500 No No Yes
Wild cluster bootstrap p-value 0.007 0.003 0.004
Conley p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.130 0.181 0.199
Number of clusters 27 27 27
Observations 930 930 930
Notes. Gross cell product data are from Nordhaus (2011). The unit of observation is a 1-degree longitude by
1-degree latitude grid cell (i.e., approximately 100 km × 100 km). Estimates are obtained by ordinary least
squares, using country fixed effects. The geographic controls are primary rivers, landlockedness, Roman road
hubs, elevation, ruggedness, and land quality. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in
parentheses, followed by corresponding p-values in brackets. We report the p-values corresponding to tests of
the conflict coefficient using the wild cluster bootstrap (to account for the small number of clusters) and Conley
(1999) standard errors (to account for spatial autocorrelation). The wild cluster bootstrap p-values are based
on 10,000 replications. The Conley standard errors use a cutoff distance of approximately 1,500 kilometers,
beyond which spatial correlation is assumed to be zero.
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Table 11: Economic Legacy of Warfare: Channels
Dep. variable: Literacy rate, 1880 Executive constraints, 1850 Urbanization rate, 1850
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Conflict 14.951 13.801 13.959 0.199 0.174 0.152 -0.660 5.347 4.679
(4.396) (2.348) (2.527) (0.180) (0.184) (0.197) (2.428) (3.102) (2.811)
[0.011] [0.001] [0.001] [0.304] [0.376] [0.464] [0.793] [0.128] [0.140]
Dist. to polity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geog. controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Pop. dens. 1500 No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Bootstrap p-val. 0.008 0.037 0.018 0.192 0.702 0.731 0.305 0.323 0.431
Conley p-val. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.226 0.333 0.417 0.747 0.003 0.009
R2 0.427 0.585 0.588 0.023 0.118 0.139 0.002 0.197 0.239
# clusters 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Observations 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65
Notes. Estimates are obtained by ordinary least squares, including country fixed effects. The geographic controls are primary rivers, land-
lockedness, Roman road hubs, elevation, ruggedness, and land quality. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses,
followed by corresponding p-values in brackets. We report the p-values corresponding to tests of the conflict coefficient using the wild cluster
bootstrap (to account for the small number of clusters) and Conley (1999) standard errors (to account for spatial autocorrelation). The wild
cluster bootstrap p-values are based on 10,000 replications. The Conley standard errors use a cutoff distance of approximately 1,500 kilometers,
beyond which spatial correlation is assumed to be zero.
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Figure 1: GDP per Capita by Region (NUTS 2), 2005
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Figure 2: Historical Conflict Exposure by Region (NUTS 2), 1500-1799
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Figure 3: Conservative 95% Confidence Intervals for β under Violations of Exclusion Restriction
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Notes. We plot conservative 95 percent confidence intervals for the effect on historical conflict exposure on
regional per capita GDP, allowing the instrument (i.e., historical exposure to young rulers) to enter the second-
stage equation directly with coefficient γ. For each δ, the dashed lines give the upper and lower bounds of the
confidence interval that allows for γ ∈ [−δ, δ]. Confidence intervals are calculated according to the methods
in Conley et al. (2012). The dotted line gives the benchmark IV estimate of β under exogeneity.
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Figure 4: Exclude Urban Belt Regions (NUTS 2)
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Figure 5: Robustness to Dropping Regions One by One
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Notes. This figure plots the estimated coefficient on conflict exposure (ordered by magnitude) and the corre-
sponding wild cluster bootstrap 95 percent confidence interval for each subsample formed by dropping one
region. The full set of control variables is included in each regression.
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Table A.1: Military Conflicts Comprising the Thirty Years’ War
Conflict Name Year Nearest Settlement Country
1 Sablat 1619 Budweis Czech Rep
2 White Hill 1620 Prague Czech Rep
3 Fleurus 1622 Fleurus Belgium
4 Hochst 1622 Frankfurt am Main Germany
5 Wimpfen 1622 Bad Wimpfen Germany
6 Stadtlohn 1623 Stadtlohn Germany
7 Breda 1624 Breda Netherlands
8 Bridge of Dessau 1625 Dessau Germany
9 Lutter 1626 Lutter am Barenberge Germany
10 Stralsund 1626 Stralsund Germany
11 Wolgast 1628 Wolgast Germany
12 Madgeburg 1630-1 Madgeburg Germany
13 Breitenfeld 1631 Leipzig Germany
14 Frankfurt (Oder) 1631 Frankfurt (Oder) Germany
15 Werben 1631 Werben (Elbe) Germany
16 Lu¨tzen 1632 Lu¨tzen Germany
17 Nuremberg 1632 Nuremberg Germany
18 River Lech 1632 Rain Germany
19 Nordlingen 1634 Nordlingen Germany
20 Tornavento 1636 Oleggio Italy
21 Wittstock 1636 Wittstock Germany
22 Breda 1637 Breda Netherlands
23 Leucate 1637 Leucate France
24 Breisach 1638 Breisach Germany
25 Fuenterrabia 1638 Hondarribia Spain
26 Rheinfelden 1638 Rheinfelden Switzerland
27 Casale 1640 Casale Monferrato Italy
28 2nd Breitenfeld 1642 Leipzig Germany
29 Le´rida 1642 Le´rida Spain
30 Rocroi 1643 Rocroi France
31 Freiburg 1644 Freiburg im Breisgau Germany
32 Allerheim 1645 Allerheim Germany
33 Jankau 1645 Jankov Czech Rep
34 Mergentheim 1645 Bad Mergentheim Germany
35 Le´rida 1647 Le´rida Spain
36 Lens 1648 Lens France
37 Zusmarshausen 1648 Zusmarshausen Germany
Source. Clodfelter (2002).
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Table A.2: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Panel A: Eurostat (2015)
Log GDP per capita, 2005 9.91 0.42 8.54 11.26 261
Log population density, 2005 5.01 1.19 0.88 9.13 257
High-tech employment, 2005 4.09 1.78 0.89 10.49 212
Log R&D spending per capita, 2005 5.10 1.30 1.57 7.49 203
Economically active pop, 2005 59.32 5.50 44.10 78.80 254
Conflict exposure, 1500-1799 0.00 1.00 −2.88 2.07 261
Exposure to young rulers, 1500-1799 0.00 1.00 −2.57 2.29 261
Avg. distance to nearest polity 189.41 580.73 6.48 6849.00 261
Primary rivers 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 261
Landlocked 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 261
Roman road hub 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00 261
Elevation 314.81 308.44 −2.64 2091.35 261
Terrain ruggedness 1.14 1.31 0.01 7.47 261
Land quality 0.61 0.25 0.00 0.99 261
Log population density, 1500 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.19 261
Panel B: Nordhaus (2011)
Log GCP per capita, 2005 3.09 0.50 1.23 4.24 930
Conflict exposure, 1500-1799 0.00 1.00 −1.56 2.69 930
Exposure to young rulers, 1500-1799 0.00 1.00 −1.43 2.78 930
Avg. distance to nearest polity 177.12 134.27 5.42 560.72 930
Primary rivers 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 930
Landlocked 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 930
Roman road hub 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 930
Elevation 356.70 405.33 −1.27 2755.61 930
Terrain ruggedness 1.37 1.52 0.01 7.59 930
Land quality 0.53 0.33 0.00 1.00 930
Log population density, 1500 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 930
Panel C: Tabellini (2010)
Literacy rate, 1880 54.84 25.94 14.60 96.50 65
Executive constraints, 1850 3.89 2.05 1.00 7.00 65
Urbanization rate, 1850 11.47 13.51 0.00 57.43 65
Conflict exposure, 1500-1799 0.00 1.00 −2.15 1.84 65
Avg. distance to nearest polity 169.24 192.50 20.51 1450.24 65
Primary rivers 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 65
Landlocked 0.31 0.47 0.00 1.00 65
Roman road hub 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 65
Elevation 350.12 261.99 0.34 947.57 65
Terrain ruggedness 1.26 1.02 0.02 3.84 65
Land quality 0.64 0.22 0.01 0.98 65
Log population density, 1500 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.19 65
Notes. See the text for variable descriptions and data sources.
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